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Abstract 
 
Jamaal Pitt: Excluding Inclusive Public Reason 
(Under the direction of Bernard Boxill) 
 
 John Rawls is well known for making a distinction in his political philosophical 
writings between what he calls “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory.  In ideal theory, the task is to 
work out a theory for what constitutes political justice in a liberal democratic society under 
certain plausible simplifying assumptions.  In non-ideal theory, one applies the ideal theory 
to cases where some of these assumptions are abandoned to see what the theory says when 
conditions closer to those found in the actual world are present.  In this thesis I argue against 
a particular application of Rawls’s ideal political theory.  This application concerns whether 
or not in certain non-ideal cases the duty of citizens to both be able and willing to offer 
justifications for their political support in terms that they expect their fellow citizens can 
understand and accept can be suspended.  I will show that this obligation cannot be 
suspended in these cases. 
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 Introduction 
The following excerpt is from a speech by Dr. Martin Luther King given in front of 
the state capitol building in Montgomery, Alabama: 
Let us march on segregated housing, until every ghetto of social and economic 
depression dissolves and Negroes and whites live side by side in decent, safe and 
sanitary housing. Let us march on segregated schools until every vestige of 
segregated and inferior education becomes a thing of the past… Let us march on 
ballot boxes, march on ballot boxes until race baiters disappear from the political 
arena… Let us march on ballot boxes, until we send to our city councils, state 
legislatures, and the United States Congress men who will not fear to do justice, love 
mercy, and walk humbly with their God.  Let us march on ballot boxes until all over 
Alabama God’s children will be able to walk the earth in decency and honor.1 
 
Such rhetoric from Dr. King was thought to be genuinely inspiring and integral to the Civil 
Rights movement of the 1960s.  However, is there something objectionable about using this 
type of speech in a public political context to advocate political change?  Notice that King in 
this passage invokes religious reasons partly as a justification of why specific political 
reforms must take place.  The appropriateness of using reasons of this sort is a question that 
has long been a topic of discussion in political philosophy, especially in reference to modern 
democracies, where one of the prominent features of such societies is the plurality of 
personal comprehensive doctrines that its citizens hold.  The plurality of comprehensive 
doctrines in democratic societies results in citizens having many different beliefs and values, 
some of which concern how the society in which they live should operate.  The problem in 
such societies concerns the disagreement among these various belief systems as to which 
laws should be enacted by a government which presides over all these citizens with different 
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beliefs.  These disagreements are often deep and because of some of the tenets of the various 
belief systems may be irresolvable.  This problem is complicated by the fact that those who 
hold incompatible beliefs nonetheless may well be sincere and well intentioned when arguing 
with fellow citizens about political matters whose comprehensive doctrines yield opposing 
ideas; they may try their best to provide honest and fair justifications to convince their fellow 
citizens of the validity of the positions they hold.  Still, they may realize in this instance that 
while other citizens with conflicting views share these sentiments, their comprehensive 
doctrines do not allow either side to accept the type of reasons offered to them (given the 
substantive content of their comprehensive doctrine and their evidence for assenting to this 
doctrine), especially when it comes to the use of political power in a society.  So the natural 
question that comes up is this:  on what grounds may we support coercive political laws that 
are binding on all citizens under a single democratic government?  It seems that allowing 
citizens to use their own personal belief systems as grounds for supporting this or that 
coercive law will inevitably lead not only to division among citizens, but also disagreements 
as to what laws are legitimate that would threaten to break down the political structure of 
society.  What is a viable alternative to approaching citizens’ support of coercive laws in this 
fashion? 
 John Rawls offers a now famous reply to the above query.  His answer comes in the 
form of his account of public reason.  In it, Rawls set up the parameters under which citizens 
may support coercive laws, either when they themselves are lending direct support to a 
coercive law (voting in favor of it, for example) or when they are arguing in favor of a law in 
a public forum.  Rawls account seeks to draw on commonalities shared by all citizens, 
commonalities which can base arguments in a political context for support of coercive laws.  
 3 
These commonalities give citizens a basis for agreement about which laws should be 
supported, whereas reasons given by their particular belief systems would not yield such 
agreement.  The commonalities stem from widely shared ideas deeply imbedded in the public 
political culture of a liberal democratic society.  From these ideas Rawls thinks we can work 
out a political conception of justice which specifies a set of political values that must be 
honored in order for the laws in the society to be legitimate and for the political 
establishment in the society to remain stable2.  Thus, Rawls’s account of public reason 
restricts the reasons that citizens can use in support of coercive laws to those that are founded 
in these commonalities which seek to endorse or promote political values.  In general, this 
means that citizens cannot use reasons from their personal belief systems as the sole basis for 
their backing of particular coercive laws.  They must use what Rawls calls public reasons in 
order to be true to the political conception of justice under which their society is governed; 
that is to say, they must use public reasons to justify their support of coercive laws so that the 
political establishment they are under is indeed legitimate with respect to all citizens.   
 Although Rawls’s answer to the problem posed by “reasonable pluralism” seems 
promising, there are some features of it that are puzzling.  One in particular is his contention 
that in certain situations the duty to use public reasons may be suspended in order to bring 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that both a political conception of justice and consequently the idea of public reason that 
accompanies it are moral ideas.  Rawls himself says they are moral ideas applied to a specific domain:  the 
political one.  As moral ideas the principles that they offer have the same type of normativity that we would 
expect any moral idea to have.  In this paper the main political moral idea that will be addressed is that of 
respecting citizens are free and equal by offering them public reasons for one’s support of binding coercive laws.  
We must remember, however, that failure to offer such reasons constitutes a failure to fully abide by a moral 
duty.  The duty to use public reasons is not a legal duty such that one can be punished or prosecuted for not 
living up to it.  Rather, the moral idea laid out by the idea of public reason involves respect and reciprocity to 
foster a society where citizens find that the political power wielded by the government is being used in an 
appropriate and legitimate manner.  When I use phrases such as “not allowed to” or “not permitted to” this 
tracks the notion that when one uses non-public reasons they are not fully living up to the moral idea set out by 
the idea of public reason and consequently the principles of the political conception of justice which they affirm.  
Of course, being an ideal, the degree to which one fulfills the duties set out by the idea of public reason varies 
from citizen to citizen.  However, this point will not be discussed at length in this paper.  I was reminded of this 
distinction in a conversation with Thomas Hill, Jr. 
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about a more just society.  He has in mind a case where non-public reasons (reasons that stem 
directly from a citizen’s personal belief system) can be utilized to help actualize a society 
that is more just with respect to a political conception of justice.  The circumstance that 
marks such situations is that of a society that is not well-ordered, to use Rawls’s term.  As 
historical examples of this he cites abolitionists that fought against slavery and the Civil 
Rights movement in the 1960s led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.  In these instances, Rawls 
argues, with regard to the fact that the societies in question were not well-ordered, non-public 
reasons were essential in bringing about conditions that would allow the political society in 
America to support a political conception of justice, and thus fully adhere to his idea of 
public reason.  However, I disagree with Rawls on this point; I do not think that in these 
situations (or more generally) the use of non-public reasons was necessary or sufficient in 
order to so move political society for reasons that stem from our desire to adhere to the idea 
of public reason in the case of a well-ordered society.  Moreover, I think that even if these 
conditions were satisfied in these or hypothetical cases where a society is not well-ordered 
that we should not grant an exception to the duty to use public reasons and that we do better 
by sticking to the principles provided for us in the idea of public reason.  On both accounts 
we have little reason to believe that the use of non-public reason will either be integral or 
even likely to create the type of society prescribed by Rawls’s theory.  
Nevertheless, in Rawls later work entitled “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” 
Rawls seems to expand his account of public reason to allow non-public reasons, even in a 
well ordered society.  Here Rawls offers a “proviso” that says in effect that citizens may 
initially use non-public reasons in the public forum to support a coercive law so long as they 
at some point provide public reasons for this support.  I find this later idea to be just as 
 5 
detrimental to the goal of regulating public political disagreement on terms acceptable to the 
citizens of a modern democratic society.  In this paper, I will first lay out the salient features 
of Rawls idea of public reason.  Next, I will discuss in more detail Rawls argument for 
thinking that in some conditions non-public reasons are preferable to public reasons.  After 
that, I will try to point out some difficulties with this argument and try to show how the strict 
use of public reasons is preferable to the use of non-public reasons even under the conditions 
where a society is not well-ordered.  Then I will present Rawls’s proviso that he introduced 
in later work and sketch a way to handle difficulties raised by it based on the previous 
discussion concerning inclusive public reason.
 Rawls’s Account of Public Reason 
 Rawls begins his account by describing the ways in which his idea of public reason is 
public.  These ways are as follows3:  1) the subject matter with which public reasons are 
applicable is the good of the society.  2)  the reason used is that of the citizens that make up 
the body politic and 3) the content of public reason is given by the society’s political 
conception of justice.  The first way makes it so the topic of public reason is the welfare of 
the citizenry, and as such all citizens have a stake in how this matter is sorted out.  The 
second way ensures that the arguments constituted by public reasons are accessible to all 
citizens.  Controversial claims from comprehensive doctrines are not permitted to be used as 
a part of the public reason.  The third way establishes that within public reason all citizens 
are concerned with the same political values, rights and obligations that are specified by their 
shared conception of political justice.  Their arguments within public reason should be 
concerned about the specific ways in which to achieve a society in accordance with what this 
political conception of justice prescribes.  These three ways make public reason available for 
use by all citizens as its methods and grounds make the reasoning conducted through its 
practice available to all people in their capacity as members of a political society.  Public 
reason should, according to Rawls, be used by citizens whenever they advocate coercive laws, 
such as in political or public forums and exercised by political officials whenever they are 
operating as such.  Non-public reasons, however, are to be used exclusively in what Rawls 
calls “the background culture”.  The background culture includes private institutions such as 
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churches as well as normal interactions between citizens in non-political contexts.  Moreover, 
non-public reasons do not share the publicity conditions that public reason possesses.  Non-
public reasons may stem from moral, philosophical and religious doctrines which may cover 
a wide range of issues, going far beyond the realm of the political.  In addition, the reasoning 
employed by one of these comprehensive doctrines may not take up the perspective of people 
in their capacity as citizens in a democratic society.  Finally, the content of these non-public 
reasons may stem from comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines that 
include substantive ideas of the good.  Such ideas may be widely different and sometimes 
incompatible or incommensurable among citizens. 
 The resort to an idea of public reason for Rawls is an extension of the idea that 
coercive laws need to be justifiable to citizens with regard to some common ground that they 
share in this capacity.  Basing coercive laws on non-public reasons violates such an idea.  
This leads Rawls to posit the liberal principle of legitimacy which says that 
…our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideas acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational.4 
 
 Here Rawls is claiming that coercive laws are only fully legitimate when they are consistent 
with a political conception of justice that citizens, given their ability to abide by such a 
political conception and to alter their personal beliefs about the good, can accept.  This 
particular view of political legitimacy commits citizens in a Rawlsian society to a further 
moral duty, called the duty of civility, in which Rawls says that citizens abiding by this duty 
must 
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…be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political 
values of public reason.5 
 
The duty of civility requires citizens to provide support for their favored coercive laws in 
terms that stem from the common ground that all citizens share, i.e. from the political 
conception of justice that they have adopted in their society and the political values that are 
promoted by such a conception.  Any support for coercive laws that falls outside of this 
realm into one where the reasons for support for a coercive law come directly from a 
citizen’s personal comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine does not enjoy 
this common ground among citizens and so violates the duty of civility and derivatively is in 
opposition to the liberal principle of legitimacy.  Rawls concedes that non-public reasons 
from one’s comprehensive doctrines may provide additional support for the public reasons 
that he employs to defend his advocacy of a coercive law; that is to say that the coercive law 
that one wishes to support may not only receive backing from the political values promoted 
by the political conception of justice that he affirms, but also may have transcendent backing 
rooted in the values honored in his personal comprehensive doctrine.  However, these non-
public reasons cannot stand in place of public reasons which a citizen must be prepared to 
offer to his fellow citizens when he is supporting a coercive law. 
 One feature of Rawls account of public reason that must be noted is that the retreat to 
political common ground that it recommends asks citizens not to resort to deciding what 
coercive laws they should support by appealing to their own personal version of the truth, i.e. 
their own personal beliefs about the way the world is and what should and should not be 
promoted or advocated in a political society.  Rawls is adamant about the fact that the way to 
foster a just and enduring political society is to abide by the constraints imposed by public 
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reason when it comes to public political deliberation.  The introduction of specific 
comprehensive doctrines into public political discussion in support of coercive laws is not 
only divisive; it fails to respect others, who as citizens, are subject to an overarching political 
authority which has the power to enforce compliance with such laws.  We do right by our 
fellow citizens, according to Rawls, by being able to explain our favoring some coercive laws 
in a language that we reasonably expect them to accept given that they hold certain political 
ideas, not by addressing them through our own personal beliefs, which may have little or no 
grip on them.  However, this would seem to at times give rise to a conflict within individual 
citizens.  What are they to do when their personal views conflict with the demands of public 
reason?  In other words, what are citizens to do when their non-public reasons call for laws 
that cannot be supported by the political values that support the society’s political conception 
of justice?  In this case Rawls calls on citizens to refrain from supporting such laws.  Those 
who understand their role as citizens are keenly aware of the consequences of insisting on 
binding coercive laws without providing a proper basis for this support to other citizens.  
While their comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines might not call 
explicitly for the political conception of justice that governs the society and its associated 
idea of public reason, in order for citizens to be considered as participating in a scheme of 
fair cooperation among the members of their society their comprehensive doctrines must at 
least be consistent with the political conception.  And since the political conception of justice 
calls on them to conduct political discussion in a certain way, namely in concert with the idea 
of public reason, they must realize that they are not permitted to press specific personal 
claims with reasons that are not acceptable to the other members of the body politic.   
 10 
 Does this mean that we expect political disagreement to be resolved once and for all 
if we use public reason?  Of course not.  Rawls fully expects that even those who honor and 
abide by the idea of public reason will disagree about the specific ordering of political values 
that supports a particular coercive law.  There still will be much discussion and deliberation 
by both citizens and political officials about what legislation can genuinely be justified by 
public reasons.  However, the idea of public reason is meant to provide a framework within 
which public political discussion can be conducted in a civil and fair manner.  This includes 
making the reasoning used by citizens and political officials accessible to all by not 
presupposing any controversial premises of the kind found in comprehensive doctrines.  
Even if one public reason argument trumps another and the coercive laws that the former 
supported is implemented in the society, the citizens who did not support this law know that 
they were treated in a politically fair manner and can understand their fellow citizen’s 
reasoning behind advocating this particular law.  Following the idea of public reason in this 
way also helps to maintain a stable political establishment, as citizens know that the coercive 
laws that are passed in their society are aimed at preserving the political justice of their 
society and so are for the good of all citizens.
 Exclusive and Inclusive Public Reason 
 Rawls thinks that his idea of public reason operates in the way described above in 
what he calls a “well-ordered” society6.  A well-ordered society according to Rawls is 
marked by three conditions.  These are that 1) the citizens of the society recognize and accept 
the same political conception of justice 2) the main political institutions in the society are 
generally regulated in accordance with this political conception of justice and 3) the citizens 
in the society act on a “sense of justice” which causes them to comply with this political 
conception.  In such a society citizens are prepared to abide by the fair terms of social 
cooperation specified by the particular political conception of justice that everyone accepts.  
This commitment entails an obligation to conduct political discourse in a certain way.  This 
way is the through the idea of public reason.  Citizens in a well-ordered society realize that 
when engaging in political debate they can only use certain reasons that draw on the political 
conception of justice to support laws.  To do otherwise would be to use reasons that others 
have no reason, from their personal point of view, to accept.  Because this fact does not make 
these citizens unreasonable, to insist on advocating coercive political laws based on non-
public reasons in a well-ordered society is illegitimate.  Thus, citizens know that in order to 
appropriately press their claims in society, and so to uphold the duty of civility, they must 
resolve to use public reasons which draw on the political values expressed by the political 
conception of justice that regulates their society.  Moreover, since citizens enjoy all the rights 
and opportunities described by the principles given by their political conception of justice 
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they are not concerned to try to press any fundamental claims by other means.  This is a case 
of what Rawls calls “exclusive” public reason. 
 However, Rawls thinks that a very different view of public reason is needed for a 
society that is not well-ordered.  As examples of such societies Rawls cites America in the 
1830s during the time of slavery and in the 1960s during the Civil Rights movement.  In the 
former case Rawls considers the abolitionists who advocated for the elimination of the 
practice of slavery.  These citizens, he claims, argued for this political reform solely on the 
basis of religious reasons.  Although they did not use reasons that all citizens could be 
expected to accept, Rawls says that the arguments constituted by these non-public reasons for 
the abolishment of slavery “supported the clear conclusions of public reason” (Political 
Liberalism 250).  Furthermore, the abolitionists might have viewed their protestations as the 
only way to move the society to a point where slavery was no longer tolerated, thus making 
the society more just.  Rawls seems to think that since public reason would endorse the 
conclusions that the abolitionists reached using non-public reasons that it was possible for the 
abolitionists to take up the former standpoint when opposing this political evil.  He says 
…take for granted that their political agitation was necessary political force leading to 
the Civil War and so to the destruction of the great evil and curse of slavery.  Surely 
they [the abolitionists] hoped for that result and they could have seen their actions at 
the best way to bring about a well-ordered and just society in which the ideal of 
public reason could eventually be honored.7 (my emphasis) 
 
Rawls goes on to say that this same line of reasoning could be applied to Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. during the Civil Rights Movement.  Although Dr. King may have used non-public 
reasons in support of securing the civil rights of African Americans, Rawls thinks that 
securing civil rights for these citizens would be supported by public reason arguments.  
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However, Rawls does draw a distinction between the cases of the abolitionists and 
that of Dr. King. The difference is that in King’s case it was much more feasible for King to 
make direct reference to arguments grounded in public reasons due to the fact that at the time 
of the Civil Rights Movement the political values expressed by the constitution were more 
correctly understood.  Nevertheless, both King and the abolitionists probably thought that 
arguing in the ways that they did was essential to achieving the end of moving the society 
that they found themselves in toward being more just, at least politically speaking.  On this 
basis, Rawls asserts that the use of non-public reasons in these cases does not go against the 
ideal of public reason, or rather more exactly King and the abolitionists did not violate the 
ideal of public reason  
…provided they thought, or on reflection would have thought (as they certainly could 
have thought), that the comprehensive reasons that they appealed to were required to 
give sufficient strength to the political conception [of justice] to be subsequently 
realized.8 
 
The main thought here seems to be that since the conclusions that the abolitionists and King 
made could be supported by public reasons that it was possible for both parties to take up 
these public reasons in defense of their advocacy for the particular political reforms they 
endorsed.  This idea on how to proceed in cases of societies that are not well-ordered Rawls 
calls the “inclusive” view of public reason. 
 Rawls introduces the distinction between inclusive and exclusive public reason 
because he reasons that the exclusive view of public reason will not be capable of providing a 
stable basis for the ideal of public reason in a society under all conditions.  Thus, he thinks 
that the inclusive view is superior to the exclusive view, since even in cases where the 
society is not well-ordered the inclusive view allows the society to be able to move forward 
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toward becoming politically just in accordance with a political conception of justice.  This 
political conception of justice of course must have with it an accompanying ideal of public 
reason that provides the proper basis on which citizens may advocate the use of coercive 
political power.  According to Rawls, the inclusive view is better than its counterpart at 
cultivating the conditions under which a society not well-ordered can become well-ordered 
and embrace the ideal of public reason.  Since the inclusive view can handle a wider 
variation of cases and is more flexible than the exclusive view, Rawls thinks that the 
inclusive view is best suited to serve his idea of public reason. 
 Problems with Inclusive Public Reason 
I think there are some serious problems with Rawls’s explanation of why inclusive 
public reason is better suited to complete his account of public reason than exclusive public 
reason.  The first thing that I want to draw our attention to are comments made by Michael 
Sandel concerning the section on inclusive public reason in his review of Political Liberalism.  
He says: 
There is little reason to suppose…that the abolitionists opposed slavery on secular 
political grounds and simply used religious arguments to win popular support.  Nor is 
there reason to think that the abolitionists sought by their agitation to make a world 
safe for secular political discourse.  Nor can it be assumed that, even in retrospect, the 
abolitionists would take pride in having contributed, by their religious arguments 
against slavery, to the emergence of a society inhospitable to the religious argument 
in political debate.  If anything the opposite is more likely the case, that by advancing 
religious arguments against so conspicuous an injustice as slavery, the evangelicals 
who inspired the abolitionist movement were hoping to encourage Americans to view 
other political questions in moral and religious terms as well.9 
 
We can help Rawls out here by claiming that he does not have to be committed to stand by 
the actual intentions of either the abolitionists or Dr. King in order for his treatment of 
inclusive public reason to be valid.  Indeed, Rawls himself says that either party would not 
have violated the idea of public reasons if only they satisfied certain conditions, which they 
may or may not have.   However, it is worth noting that if Sandel’s comments are historically 
supported, this may mean that the examples that Rawls points to are not capable of lending 
support to the point he wants to make.  Of course it would be open to him to find other 
examples that do fit more consistently with what he is trying to say, but I suspect something 
                                                 
9
 Michael Sandel “Political Liberalism” (Book Review) 
 16 
would be lost in having to abandon these two particular examples.  Both seem to be very 
powerful, eliciting just the intuitions that Rawls wants us to have about fighting for political 
justice under unfavorable conditions.  As I said before, Sandel’s comments may not have any 
direct bearing on Rawls’s reasoning in the section concerning inclusive public reason, but 
there may be presentation costs if the examples given by Rawls can be criticized as being 
historically inaccurate. 
  With that said let us, with Rawls, assert that the abolitionists, Dr. King, or others in 
prospective situations do not violate the ideal of public reason if they use non-public reasons 
in their not well-ordered society with the aim of bringing about a society run by a political 
conception of justice acceptable to everyone. 
 Hypocrisy 
 Given this assumption one thing that should be noted is the hypocrisy exhibited by 
the abolitionists and Dr. King.  They themselves knew that there were sufficient public 
reasons to eliminate the political evils that they faced, but these are not the reasons that they 
offered their fellow citizens.  Instead they gave reasons that they thought would motivate 
their fellow citizens to the same conclusions that are legitimately supported through public 
reasons.  This at least seems to be a form of some sort of insincerity, using non-public 
reasons in order to move toward a society in which these reasons are no longer allowed in 
public political discussion.  Moreover, there seems to be a bit of deception going on as well.  
As Sandel noted, those who are indeed swayed by the use of non-public reasons may be 
disheartened later to learn that these types of reasons are now off limits in a politically just 
society.  Rawls himself seems to be concerned with hypocrisy creeping up in a politically just 
society.  He brings up the issue as it regards to applying the constraints of the idea of public 
reason not only to how public political debate is regulated, but also in how citizens materially 
choose to support or not support certain coercive political laws.  One should abide by the 
ideal of public reason both in arguing for one’s favored coercive laws and in voting for this 
favored law.  Rawls does not want citizens applying the ideal of public reasons when 
discussing political issues in public forums, yet voting on these same issues based on reasons 
that are only supported by their personal comprehensive doctrines.  In this case, citizens are 
talking one way, but acting in another and this is not a suitable practice in a politically liberal 
society where both the principle of legitimacy and the duty of civility are to be honored. 
 18 
 Some may object to this claim of hypocrisy by stating that given the situations that 
the abolitionists and Dr. King found themselves in, risking hypocrisy should have been the 
least of their concerns.  Given the extreme wrongness of both slavery and the absence of civil 
rights for African-Americans, it was better for these political evils to be eliminated as soon as 
possible using the best available means to achieve this end.  If Dr. King and the abolitionists 
had worried about being hypocrites, the evils that they fought against might have lasted 
intolerably longer.  Asking the abolitionists and Dr. King to try to avoid being hypocrites 
when there was so much at stake in the society is surely an overly restrictive requirement10.  
 Such a requirement is reminiscent of the kind made by Kant in his now infamous 
lying case.11  This example goes as follows:  suppose that one of your friends comes to seek 
refuge in your home to escape a killer that is after her.  Being a good friend of course you 
agree to hide your friend from this extreme danger.  However, later on the killer shows up at 
your door asking for the whereabouts of your friend.  Many think intuitively in this case that 
you are permitted to lie to save your friend’s life.  Nevertheless, Kant asserted that lying to 
the murderer who is after your friend is morally impermissible.  Kant reached this conclusion 
on the grounds that to allow lying in certain cases would be in violation of a duty of 
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 We might distinguish between two types of hypocrites here.  In one case we have a citizen, aiming to create a 
more politically just society, holds certain public reasons for changing the political sphere of the society in 
accordance with this end and only affirms these reasons as justifying such action.  He then proceeds to observe 
the society in which he finds himself and decides that based on certain aspects of the citizenry, non-public 
reasons are the most effective way to move the society toward being more politically just.  Contrast this case 
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reasons that further support the conclusions arrived at by the public reasons.  As with the former, she offers her 
non-public reasons thinking they will be more successful in garnering support of the desired political change 
from her fellow citizens.  It seems to me in this case that the first citizen is more of a hypocrite then the second.  
Although both use non-public reasons to try to bring about a society where non-public reasons prove to be 
problematic in public political discourse, the second citizen at least believe that the non-public reasons that she 
offers her fellow citizens actually do support the particular course of political action she is recommending.  The 
first student has no such belief about the non-public reasons that he employs and merely uses them and 
consequently his fellow citizens as means to his desired end. 
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truthfulness that all rational beings have.  Kant further claims that a maxim permitting people 
to lie in certain cases could not be universalized as a principle of moral action.  The reason 
for this is that “…truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties 
founded on contract, the laws of which would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the 
least exception to them were admitted.”  Because a maxim allowing people to lie in certain 
cases when universalized threatens the entire practice of entering into honest agreements, 
Kant rejects any principles that sanction lying under any circumstances.  Kant then tries to 
assuage his readers by drawing a distinction.  He claims that if you were to tell the truth in 
the above case then any occurrence that transpires subsequent to your act is an accident; that 
is to say, if you tell the killer the whereabouts of your friend and she searches your house, 
finds and kills your friend, then you have not done anything to your friend.  While it is true 
that by telling the truth to the murderer you have “caused” your friend to endure grave harm 
(in fact she is killed), you have not wronged your friend.  Here the idea is that since telling 
the truth is an unconditional principle of morality, you have no choice but to tell the truth in 
situations where it is not an option to simply say nothing.  Moreover, it is a mere coincidence 
that in this particular case, the content of the truthful statement that you make is related to 
enabling the killer to catch your friend.  Such a contingency cannot tell against the duty to be 
truthful.  It is simply an unfortunate consequence of the principle.  For Kant, the alternative, 
that is to allow people to lie in certain situations, is far worse.   
 Many have found Kant’s discussion on this issue to be wildly implausible.  To deny 
that there may be exceptions in the application of principles of morality or justice does not 
respect the complexity of circumstances that we encounter in real life.  Moreover, there seem 
to be overriding considerations that have not been taken account of in Kant’s discussion, 
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such as the life of a human being, and the value of your friendship with the person you are 
protecting.  These sentiments seem to deny that in cases where a person lies the focus should 
be only on the intrinsic value (or disvalue) of not telling the truth.  In this and similar cases 
the emphasis is put on why the person is lying and what the person can expect to accomplish 
towards this end by lying.  Continuing on this line of thought one might think that the fact 
that you are lying to the murderer should be the last thing that is on your mind when you are 
confronted by her seeing as how the value of saving your friend’s life (or more basically an 
agent’s life) far outweighs that of being an honest person under the circumstances.  Kant was 
wrong to place the value of truth telling on par with the loss of life in all situations.  Similarly, 
one might say, in the case of inclusive public reason, the notion of hypocrisy is far 
outweighed by the injustice present in each of the respective societies.  I agree that a 
restriction on the use of non-public reasons in the situations under examination solely on the 
grounds of hypocrisy seems to be unwarranted.  The threat of being a hypocrite surely could 
not carry all of the justificatory weight concerning whether or not the abolitionists or Dr. 
King were permitted to use non-public reasons.  Although my main argument against 
inclusive reason does involve arguing as Kant did that no principled exception to the idea of 
exclusive public reason should be countenanced, this claim cannot be founded on the idea 
that those who use non-public reasons in societies that are not well-ordered, with the intent of 
establishing a society that is just according to a shared political conception of justice, risk 
being hypocrites by doing so.  Still, there are some important differences between Kant’s 
case and the cases offered by Rawls.  First of all, it is not clear that the hypocrisy involved in 
inclusive public reason will not cancel out its intended effect.  Arguing for political reform 
one way before a society is well-ordered may make it very difficult to switch to another way 
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of conducting the same type of debate in a more just society.  Let us examine this in the 
Kantian case first.  Suppose that while intending to help your friend by lying to the murderer 
your lie actually ends up directing the murderer right to her.  Surely the point of lying in the 
first place has gone unfulfilled.  Although intuitively it seems that you are not blamable for 
this turn of events, this is indeed directly contradictory to your original intentions.  If lying 
tended to have this effect in a majority of such cases, we might take more time to consider 
the viability of principles that allowed this practice.  The same I think holds when parties act 
as hypocrites in cases where inclusive public reason is embraced.  However, the stakes in 
these cases are even higher; if hypocrisy in these cases leads to a society where justice is 
defined by a particular comprehensive doctrine that a great number of the citizens have no 
reason to accept, then such a society will be marked by instability and illegitimate coercive 
laws.  This is totally opposed to the type of society that Rawls thinks is to be established by 
the account of inclusive public reason.  Taking into account the complexities of a given 
society embarking on any sort of political change, it seems safe to say that the chances that 
establishing a society capable of supporting a political conception of justice in which 
political discussion is constrained by the use of public reasons by using non-public reasons 
are much lower than that of you successfully helping your friend by lying the murderer.  The 
chance of success for your actions does appear to be a salient factor in prescribing principles 
for either people or citizens to act on given the aim that they have taken up. 
 Additionally, being hypocritical with regard to the idea of public reason threatens to 
be an enduring condition.  Having been so successful in the society that was not well-ordered, 
citizens may continue to think that the best way to affect political change is by appeal to non-
public reasons.  Although they themselves want a society that embraces a political 
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conception of justice, their previous success using non-public reasons makes this tactic seem 
like a viable way of effecting political change.  Moreover, some citizens themselves may not 
be convinced based on the earlier persuasiveness of non-public reasons that a refusal to let 
these types of reasons decide which political views to support is the right thing to do.  They 
may either openly question this particular aspect of the well-ordered society or they may act 
in the way that Rawls feared.  They may superficially conduct their public political 
discussion according to the constraints imposed by the idea of public reason, but resort only 
to their private comprehensive doctrines to decide which policies they will vote for.  Also, 
they may decide on whether to support a political issue based on their comprehensive 
doctrine as a result of the precedent set in cases where inclusive public reason was honored, 
and from there attempt to construct ad hoc public justifications to support the positions they 
decided on in a non-public way.  This last case may not seem to be as worrisome, since if 
they are successful in finding good public reason arguments for their position it seems that 
they are permitted to support whatever coercive law this public reason argument supports.  
Nonetheless, we must remember the idea of public reason falls within the context of an idea 
about political morality.  And in this idea of political morality we are to honor a condition of 
reciprocity in which everyone agrees in the public political arena to retreat to a common 
political conception of justice with its associated political values in order to be justified in 
giving our backing to laws that bind all citizens.  Given this, making decisions about laws 
based on one’s personal comprehensive doctrine and then searching for a public reason 
argument to support this decision is an inappropriate way to proceed as a responsible citizen.  
The important thing to take from this discussion is that the hypocritical nature of inclusive 
public reasons threatens to ingratiate itself in the future political workings of society.  
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Proceeding in the way that inclusive public reason prescribes seems to sow seeds that will 
undermine the type of society that it is meant to preserve.  Again, let us return to the Kantian 
case to perhaps see this point a little clearer.  Suppose that when you are confronted by the 
murderer you cannot help your friend by only telling the murderer one lie.  Suppose further 
that you must weave an intricate web of deceit in order to keep him off balance and unable to 
locate your friend.  Notice first that this imposes a greater burden on you.  In addition, each 
lie that you are forced to tell has more of a chance to unravel the whole deception that you 
have perpetrated.  While some will undoubtedly be inclined to assert that lying should still be 
permitted as the life of your friend is surely worth all the trouble you have to go through to 
preserve it (and I think the analogy between the two cases breaks down here), the point is that 
much needs to be done to work out what value lying has in connection to the consequences 
that it brings about.  The same holds true for hypocrisy in the Rawlsian case.   
 In addition, I think there is another feature specific to the case of inclusive public 
reason that also separates it from the Kantian example in an important way.  Remember that 
in the case of inclusive public reason, those who use non-public reasons in a society that is 
not well-ordered, yet who intend for their use of such reasons to provide a suitable ground for 
establishing a politically just society consistent with a widely accepted political conception of 
justice do not, Rawls thinks, violate the idea of public reason.  However, there seems to be 
something intrinsically wrong with using a means to an end which denounces or discourages 
the very means used to get there.  This is precisely what Rawls is prescribing for those who 
find themselves in a situation where he thinks inclusive public reason is applicable.  Both the 
abolitionists and King, if they were to fully honor the idea of public reason according to 
Rawls, needed to be able to view themselves as using non-public reasons instrumentally in 
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order to bring about a more politically just society.  Nonetheless, such a tactic seems very 
problematic, at least from a personal integrity standpoint.  Of all the means available to the 
abolitionists or Dr. King (or persons in any prospective example that we may encounter), one 
might think that had they had in view securing a Rawlsian well-ordered society they would 
not be eager to try to employ non-public reasons in pursuit of this goal, knowing that their 
use would be discouraged in this society as being opposed to the spirit and principles found 
in the idea of public reason.  This notion seems to be similar to Kant’s sentiments regarding 
the lying case.  He thought that lying to achieve an end, no matter how good, ultimately was 
contradictory to the moral duties required of rational agents.  As such the rational agent was 
not permitted to achieve an end (even a morally good one) using means that the idea of 
morality expressly forbid.  Of course objectors doubted that the dictates of morality would 
put lying on par with other things of moral worth (like other people’s lives), but if Rawls is 
right about the value of the idea of public reason, then the case of inclusive public reason is a 
case where this kind of tension between the means to an end and the end arises.  The political 
moral agent here, if he is truly looking to make his society more politically just, must in this 
case avoid the use of non-public reasons if he is to fully the politically moral principles that 
he claims to endorse. 
A final closely related point concerning the issue of hypocrisy.  The justification for 
using public reasons as opposed to non-public reasons in the idea of public reason is closely 
tied to respecting an idea of reciprocity; this idea entails a willingness of citizens to not 
impose coercive political power on those to whom we cannot give reasons that we can 
reasonably expect they will find acceptable.  This is the way in which we show proper 
respect for our fellow citizens as free and equal.  Essentially this is what is conveyed by the 
 25 
previously mentioned liberal principle of legitimacy and the duty of civility.  This enduring 
respect that citizens show for each other is one of the primary safeguards of the type of 
political atmosphere found in a well-ordered society.  From this it seems rather intuitive that 
the same kind of respect for other citizens should be shown in cases where inclusive public 
reason is alleged to be appropriate.  Supporting political changes in this instance using 
reasons that are not widely accessible to citizens in general is in direct conflict with the duty 
of civility, a cornerstone of the idea of public reason.  Those who use non-public reasons in 
cases of inclusive public reason are not demonstrating a willingness to explain their support 
for political reform in terms that properly appreciate the capacities of their fellow citizens.  
Thus, the grounds for fostering this type of respect among citizens is surely harder to bring 
about, since political change in the instance of inclusive public reason rests on reasons whose 
foundation requires beliefs that many from their own point of view have no reason to accept.  
Even if citizens with dissenting beliefs agree with the conclusions that are reached by 
arguments employing non-public reasons, they may be wary of other implications of the 
comprehensive views that they come from, while not finding adequate evidence available for 
embracing the particular doctrine.  Surely the person who insists on bringing about political 
change in this way does something both hypocritical and antithetical concerning the essence 
of the idea of public reason.
 Conditions of Necessity and Sufficiency 
Above I have tried to provide some support for the claim that, although it by itself 
seems unable to support a general ban on using non-public reasons to support political reform 
in a not well-ordered society, the disvalue of being a hypocrite under such circumstances 
cannot be simply dismissed as being completely outweighed by the circumstances that 
characterize the society a person finds himself in.  A further point to explore relates to claims 
of necessity inherent in the cases we have been discussing.  The idea at work here is this: use 
of non-public reasons in societies that are not well-ordered can at least some times be the 
only way to move the society towards being more well-ordered and thus more politically just.  
The examples of the abolitionists and the Civil Rights movements are intended to be 
instances of this12.  Yet apart from this it appears to be conceptually plausible that we might 
imagine an instance where there is no other possible way to eliminate a political evil other 
than to resort to the use of non-public reasons.  However, I wish to challenge this claim.  As 
before, I hope to gain some illumination for my claims through the use of the Kantian 
example we have been using throughout our discussion.  In that case we (rightly) are inclined 
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 Even though Rawls is not simply arguing a historical point when he takes up the question of whether or not it 
was necessary for either the abolitionists or Dr. King to use non-public reasons in their respective circumstances, 
it is worth noting that elements of both cases seem to contain factors that initially suggest otherwise.  In 
conversations with Bernie Boxill, he introduced that as a matter of historical record there was  split between 
abolitionists as to which was the best way to proceed advocating the elimination of slavery.  Some did indeed 
think that use of religious (non-public) reasons were the sole means of effecting a more just society.  However, 
another contingent argued vigorously that this end would be better served by using something like public 
reasons to move the society in a more positive direction.  Such a division throws a little doubt on the claim that 
there was only one (or that it seemed to the abolitionists that this was the case) viable avenue of action capable 
of bringing about a more just society.  Rawls himself acknowledges that in the King case that the use of public 
reasons were available given that a proper interpretation of the constitution was available during the Civil 
Rights movement. 
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to assert that, given the circumstances, lying is the only way to ensure the safety of our friend.  
It does not take much to imagine such circumstances coming about.  For instance, the 
murderer could be physically much bigger then you are and so fighting him would not be a 
viable option; or perhaps you left your trusty handgun under your bed and so you are not in a 
position to use it against the murderer, and so on.  In the lying case it is easy to construct the 
appropriate conditions where lying is necessary to save your friend, or it is at least highly 
reasonable to draw this conclusion.  The same cannot be said of prospective cases of 
inclusive public reason, however.  The dynamics of political society are not such that we 
would be in a position to ground a claim as strong as that of necessity.  There are simply too 
many factors that come into play when talking about how political change takes place to be 
able with the requisite amount of precision assert that this or that action was necessary in 
order to bring about this or that result.  We should be skeptical of articulating the several 
conditions under which such a claim of necessity would be true, and even more so of our 
ability to recognize at a particular time when all of these conditions, if they could be given, 
were fulfilled.  This is especially true when the means that one wants to say are necessary are 
such that they are in conflict with the end that they are meant to bring about, as we have seen 
is the case with inclusive public reason in the earlier discussion about hypocrisy.  While there 
certainly is no guarantee that the use of public reasons in a society that is not well-ordered is 
the only way to bring about a society that is more politically just and is capable of supporting 
in the long run the idea of public reason, it seems implausible to suggest that means other 
than this would be necessary to achieve this type of society.   
Apart from the claim of necessity we can consider separately one of sufficiency.  
Suppose we grant that those who want to say that non-public reason, in the situations that 
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Rawls outlines, is necessary to bring about the political society that is desired are correct.  
Still we can ask the question whether, given that the means are necessary to achieve a certain 
goal, they will, or are likely to, in fact, achieve the goal in question.13  In other words, how 
confident can we be that using non-public reasons, though they are seemingly the only way 
to move the society towards being more just, will be successful in bringing about this end?  
As with the claim of necessity, I think that one of sufficiency turns out ultimately to be 
unsustainable.  We do not have good reason, as Rawls seems to think we do, to believe that 
the use of non-public reasons will be likely to bring about a society that is well-ordered in the 
way that he describes this particular term.  We might come to this conclusion by again citing 
some inconsistencies that we noted earlier in the discussion.  For one thing, using non-public 
reasons successfully to get rid of some political evil seems to provide grounds for people to 
encourage its use in society, rather than to discourage it.  Moreover, those who advocated the 
use of non-public reasons in the not well-ordered society who do not wish to continue this 
practice will be hard pressed to explain to their fellow citizens why such a practice should no 
longer be allowed.  Furthermore, a different aspect of the case of inclusive public reason that 
might cause us to lose confidence in the sufficiency of using non-public reasons again rests 
on our ability to know certain things about the efficacy of actions concerning political change.  
Returning to the Kantian case, it seems safe to say that you, in lying to the murderer about 
your friend’s whereabouts, can be reasonably sure that your deception will be enough to 
throw the murderer off of your friend’s trail (assuming that you are not horrible at lying or 
that the murderer does not already know the whereabouts of your friend).  Contrastingly, the 
numerous factors involved in moving a society towards embracing political justice do not 
avail themselves to us with anything close to this type of certainty.  We can be modestly 
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 I owe this point to a conversation with Thomas Hill, Jr. 
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confident that our earnest efforts to bring out change consistent with certain principles will 
make our political society better, but not so much so that we think that we have mastered all 
of the different variables involved in effecting such a change.  Using non-public reasons in a 
case where the society is not well-ordered seems to offer itself to many unpredictable effects, 
some that will almost surely make the move toward a society capable of sustaining the idea 
of public reasons much more difficult.  To those who say that the use of public reasons gives 
way to the same sort of uncertainty at a threshold of epistemological humility, I think we 
may respond by saying that in this instance what recommends to us the use of strictly public 
reasons are the consistency concerns that we noted earlier concerning the duties prescribed to 
us by the political conception of justice which we have in view when engaging in action to 
alter the society in which we find ourselves. 
 No Exceptions for Necessity 
 Having disputed the assertion that in prospective cases of inclusive public reason we 
can readily say that the use of non-public reasons are necessary to achieve our goal of 
securing a more politically just society, I am now prepared to claim that even if we could 
establish that these cases did admit of a kind of necessity for the use of non-public reasons 
that we should not make exceptions based on this fact to the principles put forth by the idea 
of public reason.  In order words, we should not bend the rules laid down by the idea of 
public reason for particular cases of this kind.  The reasons for this that I offer here again, 
taken separately, do not, I think, hold enough justificatory power to support this conclusion; 
however, taken in tandem, however, I think they build a strong case for accepting my 
position. 
 The first of these reasons is that the cases where we might initially think that 
inclusive public reason might be applied are very rare.  Take for example the cases that 
Rawls presents to us as instances where inclusive public reason is needed.  Without 
questioning whether or not it was necessary to use non-public reasons in the service of 
bringing about a more politically just society, we can notice that, as a matter of fact, these 
incidents occurred roughly 100 years apart.  Only given this information it hardly seems as if 
this is a case that happens often enough to incorporate a provision for it in the idea of public 
reason (unless, perhaps, we knew it was guaranteed to happen once every 100 years).  
Nonetheless, what if we abstract from the historical record and think of possible cases of 
societies that are not well-ordered?  Do we think that, given what it would take for us to say 
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for sure that such a society necessarily needed the use of non-public reasons to advance 
toward political justice, that such an occurrence would be likely to come to pass regularly 
enough for us to be concerned about how to deal with such situations?  I think the answer to 
this question is no.  The specific alignment of factors that would cause us to declare a case of 
this kind of necessity is such that I think we can be confident that its occasion would not be 
one that we would encounter with sufficient regularity to incorporate a notion like inclusive 
public reason into the idea of public reason.  We might gain more insight here from the 
Kantian case.  One thing that may bother us about the injunction never to lie is that we 
encounter situations all of the time where we think that it is morally permissible to lie; so 
much so that it seems counterintuitive to suggest that a moral principle requiring us not to lie 
in any situation can be right.  In contrast, the situations where using non-public reasons are 
necessary for political change are so intricate that we should not feel compelled to think that 
these conditions present themselves with anything approaching the regularity with which 
people find themselves in situations where a morally viable option to take is to lie.  This 
becomes even clearer when we reflect on the fact that Rawls’s theory is specifically tailored 
to liberal democratic societies, which imports further conditions to be satisfied in order to 
call forth the duties and obligations associated with his political theory. 
 The next reason related to denying that cases where it is necessary to use non-public 
reasons merit an exception from the rules of conduct in the political realm of society 
specified by the idea of public reason has to do with our limited ability to know what 
conditions constitute this kind of necessity.  This particular reason has been hinted at 
throughout much of the discussion in the previous sections.  As before, the main idea here is 
that given our limited ability to know all of the variables involved in moving a political 
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society in the direction towards being more just, we should follow the principles that we 
derive in an acceptable way from premises that we all can reasonably be expected to affirm 
and not grant exceptions to these principles based on claims of purported necessity.  I have 
talked at length about the complexities involved in changing the political culture of a society 
and why we have good reason to be skeptical that we could ever approach anything 
approaching the kind of certainty about the factors that would be involved in making a claim 
of what is absolutely necessary to achieving a particular political goal.  The best we can do, I 
think, is to proceed in the manner that Rawls lays out for us, assuming that he does indeed 
provide the sorts of reasons that citizens, interpreted in a thin, but plausible way, can accept.  
We must not forget that Rawls implores us when following his political theory to employ the 
notion of reflective equilibrium, where we test the theory that he offers against our intuitions 
and vice versa.  This method of guiding our conduct related to the theory takes into account 
an epistemic modesty that we must be honest with ourselves about.  Reflective equilibrium 
allows us to factor in empirical evidence as best we can gather it about how different 
variables affect political processes, while at the same time preserving an ideal that we think 
has the justification in favor of it requisite for us to continue pursuing it as a worthy goal to 
achieve.  Using reflective equilibrium we can inform both our intuitions from the dictates of 
the theory, or conversely alter the theory in light of new facts that we think should be 
accounted for.  We are not bound by the use of reflective equilibrium to strive to know things 
that would be very difficult or near impossible for us to be able to know with any measure of 
conclusiveness.  When thinking about how to act in order to effect political change we must 
not attempt to take up the perspective of an all knowing ideal observer, who may be able to 
say with complete certainty that circumstances in a particular situation necessarily call for the 
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use of non-public reasons.  We should instead understand that by accepting Rawls idea of 
public reason, we thereby have accepted certain constrains on what we can view as acting in 
accordance with this idea both in general and in particular situations.  Though it may seem 
that in a particular situation adherence to these principles is not advantageous, and indeed 
may have tragic results, that we have affirmed these principles prevents us from attempting 
to take up an all-knowing viewpoint in a case by case basis.  Refraining from trying to take 
up an omniscient perspective fits in better with how we actually make decisions as to what 
the best course of action is both in the political arena and beyond. 
 The last, and perhaps most important of the reasons for my position against granting 
an exception to cases of necessity involving the use non-public reasons is the potential for 
this provision to be abused.  To gain a proper footing on the issues involved with this claim 
let us turn to another example of a case where at least there seems to be a prima facie case for 
granting exceptions for a case of necessity.  I have in mind the idea of a Supreme Emergency 
which has been widely discussed in the literature concerning Just War theory.  In his book, 
The Morality of War, Brian Orend describes a supreme emergency as a situation where a 
state engaged in war with another state may abandon jus in bello (justice during war).  This 
means that one state can disregard moral (and international) rules that are to govern conduct 
during warfare provided three conditions are met.  These three conditions are as follows:14 
1. The state making use of the supreme emergency exemption is one that is the 
victim of (physical) aggression from another state. 
2. The state making use of the supreme emergency exemption is on the verge or is 
already experience a military collapse. 
3. The state making use of the supreme emergency exemption has good reason to 
believe that defeat by the aggressor will lead to massive suffering imposed on the 
citizenry of the victim state, including but not limited to widespread massacre 
and/or slavery. 
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 Brian Orend The Morality of War.  Broadview Press pp.145 
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This definition of a supreme emergency draws on others views concerning this idea, most 
notably from the views espoused by Michael Walzer.  The intuitive idea behind a supreme 
emergency is this.  Jus in bello rules are supposed to be designed to respect the rights of 
citizens and soldiers from both the victim state and the aggressive state as much as possible 
while still allowing the victim state to defend itself from unwarranted aggression from other 
states.  However, it seems as if sometimes the aggressive state’s intentions in starting a war 
with another state go far beyond paltry concerns about economic or state interest.  Sometimes 
the aggressive state is so terrible that to concede victory to it will be to put one’s state at the 
mercy of a state who intends to commit heinous atrocities on the citizens of the victim state.  
They publicly demonstrate that their sole goal is to subject the victim country to the most 
extreme pain and suffering should it be victorious in the war.  At this point the supreme 
emergency allows the victim state to take off the kid gloves, so to speak.  In this instance, the 
victim state can abandon strictly following the dictates of international law for conduct 
during warfare and moral theory concerning warfare and use whatever means they deem 
necessary in order to properly defend its citizens from so horrible a threat.   
 The clearest example of a supreme emergency in the just war theory literature occurs 
during the early stages of World War II15.  This case involves the attempted German invasion 
of Britain.  Germany, having already been successful in invading other European countries 
up to this point, turned its attention to Britain and began bombing attacks to weaken British 
defenses and terrorize its citizens.  Winston Churchill, appearing to know full well the scope 
of Germany’s ambitions and intentions, decided to attack the German mainland in an attempt 
to deter a German offensive on Britain.  The British attack included bombing raids on 
German civilian targets; targeting civilians during warfare is expressly forbid in just war 
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theory and international law under normal war conditions.  However, due to the type of threat 
that the German military and their state presented, it has been widely accepted that Britain 
was definitely in a situation of supreme emergency. 
 The case of a supreme emergency is one where theorists have wanted to make an 
exception for cases of necessity.  The necessity involved in these particular cases involves 
providing states with the ability to be able to properly defend and protect their citizens 
against the gravest threats to their existence.  It would be wrong, these theorists want to say, 
to hold that states that find themselves under the conditions listed above should refrain from 
doing what is necessary to preserve the rights of their citizens by insisting that they continue 
to strictly adhere to either the principles of a just war theory or the statues contained in 
international law.  However, there has been opposition to allowing for the idea of a supreme 
emergency exemption within just war doctrine on the basis that such an exemption is liable 
to be abused.  Two examples of this also take place during World War II.  One example of 
this occurs when Allied forces continued bombing attacks on German cities towards the end 
of the war16.  The other concerns the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki perpetrated by the United States at the end of World War II.  Although those in 
favor of the atomic bombings have hinted at something like a defense using the supreme 
emergency exemption, many critics, including Rawls himself17, have denounced the 
bombings and shown that all three conditions mentioned above were not fulfilled when the 
United States engaged in this action against the Japanese (in fact Rawls argues that they were 
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far from being fulfilled18).  What should draw our attention here is the flawed use of this 
exemption as grounds for engaging in unjust behavior in these situations.    
 Now we are in a position to relate this example to the case that we are interested in.  
Like the supreme emergency exemption, the case of inclusive public reason is asking us to 
grant an exception to the principles given by the idea of public reason because of the 
purported necessity of using non-public reasons in societies that are not well-ordered in order 
to achieve a more politically just society.  And, also like the supreme emergency exemption, 
inclusive public reason is very liable to be abused in ways that have disastrous results.  In the 
supreme emergency case these results were the illegitimate loss of life of both German and 
Japanese citizens.  In the case of a political society the results would be a society incapable of 
living up to the political moral ideas specified in the idea of public reason and in Rawls’s 
wider political theory.  Rawls envisions cases of inclusive public reason where constitutional 
essentials are at stake as eliciting the necessary use of non-public reasons.  However, it does 
not take much to see that such a provision has great potential to be abused.  Take the 
contemporary issues of abortion and same sex marriage.  At least one side of either issue has 
claimed that key constitutional issues are at stake in the resolving of these issues.  If Rawls 
were to incorporate inclusive public reason into his overall theory, what is to prevent these 
citizens from employing their non-public reasons concerning these issues in the public 
political culture?  Could they not argue that the society which they find themselves in is not 
well-ordered because the constitution that presides over it is incomplete in a serious way and 
therefore they should be able to use their best non-public reasons in order to convince others 
of their positions and win the day?  While it is hard to know if the claims about how these 
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issues connect with constitutional essentials are plausible, the existence of such a link is more 
easily discerned by discussing these issues in a framework called for by the idea of public 
reason.  It has been well documented that both sides of these issues affirm different 
comprehensive doctrines and so resorting to reasons stemming from these doctrines when 
trying to decide whether or not we can legitimately coerce others into acting one way or 
another has been extremely difficult and largely unsuccessful.  Rawls’s idea of public reason 
offers a way in which we do not simply bully our fellow citizens into acting through the 
power of binding laws by being part of a majority who happens to affirm one comprehensive 
doctrine over another, but instead we embrace them and their capacities as free and equal 
citizens by giving them arguments based on key political ideas that we are reasonably sure 
that they accept.  We push the realization of this idea further out of reach by setting a 
precedent of using non-public reasons as a legitimate basis for political change.  The 
opportunities to use such an exemption erroneously are far too numerous in our current 
political culture; allowing the kind of exemption called for by inclusive public reason gives 
too frequent occasion for the use of non-public reasons, so much so that the political culture 
would be ill equipped to develop fully the ideal of public reason and its accompanying duties 
and obligations. 
 Some might argue against this point that, although it may be true that the supreme 
emergency exemption has been abused as evidenced in historical record, and has the 
potential to be abused again, it still seems irresponsible to forbid its application entirely.  
Should the very existence of citizens as human beings be threatened, surely we need to be 
able to grant a state whose primary duty is the protection of its citizens and their rights the 
ability to enact the means necessary to do their best to avert a horrible future from coming to 
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pass.  At this point all other concerns must be subordinate to that of maintaining the rights of 
the citizens and this responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders of the state in this case.  
Similarly, the potential for inclusive public reason to be abused, no matter how great, cannot 
be used to argue in favor of dismissing this idea totally.  However, there is an important 
difference between the two cases which preserves the intuition in the former case, but not in 
the latter.  The difference is this:  as previously stated, the state’s primary concern is to 
protect the rights of its citizens.  The supreme emergency exemption fits in with this as an 
extreme case where this duty is to be fulfilled.  While in normal conditions it is incumbent on 
the state in general just war theory to not only be cognizant of the rights of its own citizens, 
but also to conduct themselves in a way that does not flagrantly violate the rights of other 
citizens that may be either involved or affected in the armed conflict, at the limit of a range 
of cases where the supreme emergency exemption arises, the central duty of the state to 
protect its citizens remains prominent.  Contrastingly, in the case of inclusive public reason 
the strong link between the reasoning behind the proposed exemption and the duties given by 
the idea of public reason is does not exist.  At its core the idea of public reason implores us to 
show due respect to our fellow citizens by restricting ourselves to arguing from ideas that we 
are not unreasonable in expecting them to affirm.  This is not what is evident in cases of 
inclusive public reason, however.  In these cases, while there may be a hope that the use of 
non-public reasons will bring the society ever closer to a point where citizens can accept a 
political conception of justice and within this conception an idea of public reason, the focus 
is given to using non-public reasons as a legitimate justification to change the political 
society.  As I have claimed in numerous places throughout our discussion, this is at odds with 
fulfilling the end that is being strived for.  This is the basis for granting an exemption to just 
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war theory in cases of supreme emergencies, but not for cases of necessity where it would be 
appropriate according to Rawls to employ the idea of inclusive public reason.  The adherence 
to the provision allowing the supreme emergency exemption comes directly from the primary 
duty of the state; however, the use of non-public reasons in a not well-ordered society does 
not seem to spring forth from the idea of public reason. 
 The Proviso 
 In his later work “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” Rawls expands on the idea of 
public reason that he introduced in Political Liberalism.  One important difference that Rawls 
makes in this discussion of the idea of public reason is his presentation of what he calls the 
proviso.  Rawls statement of the proviso is given below. He says that 
…reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced 
into public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper 
political reasons─and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines─are 
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said 
to support.19 (my emphasis) 
 
The proviso is basically an extension of the earlier idea conveyed by inclusive public reason, 
except that now we are applying this idea to a well-ordered society, whereas before we were 
only applying it to a society that was not well-ordered.  This move, which by Rawls has been 
said to constitute a “widening” of his view of public reason, seems to have been largely 
motivated by criticisms that Rawls, in his initial presentation of his idea of public reason, did 
not take seriously enough the role that citizen’s comprehensive doctrines played in 
influencing their views in political discourse and that his earlier idea stripped citizens of 
something that they feel is vitally essential when fulfilling their political duties as they are 
laid out by the idea of public reason and other parts of Rawls’s political theory.  The proviso 
is offered as a way to allow comprehensive doctrines their place in political discussion 
without abandoning the core principles detailed by the former presentation of the idea of 
public reason.  We can see this when we pay attention to the fact that in the passage above 
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Rawls asserts that even though comprehensive doctrines may be introduced into public 
political discussion, ultimately public reasons must be given to justify their introduction into 
this discussion as providing the real grounding for advocating the political action that is at 
issue in the foregoing political debate.  Another interesting feature of the above passage is 
Rawls’s use of the phrase “in due course”.  Here he seems to want to allow citizens to 
introduce their comprehensive doctrines in the public political domain when necessary (for 
example, imagine a citizen must cast their vote for a law and has not had the requisite time to 
reflect on a proper public reason(s) for either advocating or not advocating the law) without 
immediately after engaging in such political action having to produce public reasons for it.  
However, at some point they must be able to provide their fellow citizens with appropriate 
public reasons that justify their political advocacy in order to show that they have not 
abandoned the duty of civility.  Rawls leaves the intricate details of exactly how we should 
interpret “due course” up to the particular conditions present in our liberal democratic 
political community.  He is clear, however, that the requirement to give one’s fellow citizens 
public reasons in the future is made in “good faith”, meaning that to fail to do so violates the 
duty of civility and thus that the citizen in question is not fully living up the duties and 
obligations she has to her fellow citizens as prescribed by the ideal of public reason.  He 
assumes that we can commonsensically determine when citizens have abused this good faith, 
and so not offered in due course public reasons, or public reasons sufficiently acceptable to 
justify the political action that was taken by the citizen. 
 Evaluating the Proviso 
 Rawls imagines that the proviso is most plausibly applied in the situation hinted at 
above when a citizen must vote on some piece of legislation, which, at the time they are 
voting, do not possess a public reason in support or against their advocacy of the law.  The 
case for the proviso is made even more compelling if we add the condition, as Rawls does, 
that the legislation concerns a new sort of issue which has not been subject at length to any 
large amount of political discourse within the accepted political conception of justice.  Since 
one is not sure exactly how the issue that they are voting on connects with the political 
conception of justice and the political values that it promotes, the idea is that one may vote 
based on her intuitions provided by the comprehensive doctrine that she affirms.  Here we 
have a case where it is practically necessary for a citizen to act even though her political 
action can not at the present time be clearly sanctioned by the principles provided by the idea 
of public reason.  For this reason, Rawls thinks the introduction of the proviso provides a 
good way to deal with such cases.  While I will not discuss at length whether or not I think 
the proviso is capable of ultimately consistent with the rest of the idea of public reason, I will 
sketch some thoughts on how I think this question can be addressed.   
 First of all, I think whether or not we should be able to introduce our comprehensive 
(non-public) doctrines into political discourse in accordance with the proviso turns on the 
conditions I earlier outlined for answering the similar question with inclusive public reason.  
That is to say we should ask ourselves how often will such a scenario come up in a well-
ordered society?; can we expect to know when our previous knowledge concerning the 
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political conception of justice runs out so that we have to, when deciding on a political matter 
in a particular situation, rely on our comprehensive doctrine to make a decision?; and finally, 
will the proviso be liable to being abused?  Concerning the last point, at first glance it seems 
as if making decisions on political issues at first according to our comprehensive doctrine and 
then searching for public reason arguments with which to support these decisions is opposed 
to the spirit of the idea of public reason.  This spirit asks us not to pay special attention to our 
personal comprehensive doctrines, but to look for ideas shared by our fellow citizens in the 
wider public political culture.  Once we find such ideas, we are to confine ourselves to their 
use to be more or less sure that the arguments that we offer to them will be acceptable to 
them.  However, beginning from one’s comprehensive doctrine to make a political decisions 
and then searching for public reasons to support this decision seems to me to be a 
problematic way to try to honor the condition of reciprocity implied by the previous 
statement.  The spirit behind the idea of public reason asks us to prioritize resorting to 
common ground with our fellow citizens (the right) over looking to honor specific values 
promoting by our comprehensive doctrines (the good).  However, in the case described 
where Rawls wants to allow citizens to employ the proviso, this priority seems to get 
switched.  Now the citizen has made a decision based on some personal idea of the good, and 
now it is plausible to think that her intention will be to find a public reason argument capable 
of supporting the comprehensive values that she used in making her initial political decision.  
Of course Rawls would probably object that the citizen should be prepared to think that she 
voted incorrectly if her subsequent search for public reasons arguments in support of her 
political advocacy revealed that the political conception that she accepts can provide no such 
justification.  Perhaps this is all we can reasonably ask for in this case.  Nevertheless, as I 
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stated above, I only wish here to gesture at what it would take to give a full answer 
concerning the viability of the proviso within the greater framework provided by the idea of 
public reason. 
 Conclusion 
 As has probably been evident throughout this paper, my worry with Rawls’s work has 
nothing to do with his theoretical framework.  It has primarily to do with a particular 
application of this framework.  I have attempted in this paper to offer a convincing 
presumptive case against including inclusive public reason within the wider idea of public 
reason.  I do not think that given the constraints that we find in Rawls political theory, 
especially the discussion of the idea of public reason that his theory yields the result that he 
thinks it does.  The idea of public reason is best secured in the long run by conforming to its 
principles as best one can even in a society that is not well-ordered.  By doing this we lay 
down the foundation of respect and feelings of reciprocity that will be key as the society 
moves forward to being more political just to implement fully the idea of public reason.  This 
is not to insinuate that it will be easy, especially in non-ideal conditions to accomplish this 
task.  Nonetheless, if what we have in view as our destination is a just society where 
reasonable citizens affirm a political conception of justice, then this is the way that we must 
proceed in order to give ourselves the best opportunity of realizing this worthy end. 
 Another point that I want to make before ending my discussion of these issues is that 
my arguments in this paper are not meant to denounce the actions of either the abolitionists 
or Dr. King.  I admire both for trying as best they could to rid their respective societies of 
great injustices; in the former case, the scourge of slavery and in the latter case the appalling 
lack of Civil Rights for minorities in the United States.  However, it does not seem to me that 
some of the methods they used in fighting these social evils can aid us in doing our best to 
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bring about the kind of society that Rawls’s theory describes for us.  This claim concerns 
both historical references that Rawls offers as well as any prospective case where a society is 
not well-ordered.  This is the main point of the paper, and I hope I have not been too 
confusing in trying to make it. 
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